The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings by Densmore, Mike
The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings 
 
 
 
Mike Densmore, MSc in Management (Finance) 
 
 
 
 
Graduate Program 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
MSc in Management (Finance) 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Business, Brock University 
St. Catharines, Ontario 
 
© 2012 
  
i 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit 
rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are 
informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income 
securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk 
information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and 
spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) 
spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three 
agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical 
CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that 
credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
Rating agencies provide markets with information regarding credit 
worthiness and presumably reduce uncertainty by increasing the information flow 
between investors and issuers. The 2011 Standard and Poor’s Guide to credit rating 
essentials states that “Credit ratings are opinions about credit risk. Standard & 
Poor’s ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an 
issuer, such as a corporation or state or city government, to meet its financial 
obligations in full and on time”. Hence agencies decrease the cost of searching, 
analyzing and monitoring creditworthiness by investors. This should also lower the 
cost of lending and borrowing between issuers and lenders.(Moody’s Special 
Comment, 2002). 
Recent major systemic credit events have occurred without clear warnings 
from the rating agencies which questions their informational value. For example 
consider the downfall of Bear Stearns. Prior to filing for bankruptcy there were 
ample signals showing their deteriorating credit worthiness which rating agencies 
failed to recognize. Bear Stearns had two highly levered hedge funds which were 
invested in the subprime mortgage market. In early 2007 when mortgages began to 
frequently default these funds started to experience large losses. In July 2007 the 
two funds collapsed. The rating agencies did not act on this information until 
November 15th 2007 when S&P downgraded Bear Stearns rating from A+ to A. 
Ratings were not changed again until March 14th 2008, where S&P lowered Bear 
Stearns rating to BBB. This followed the announcement of an emergency loan from 
the FED through JP Morgan. These major events were not surprises. Other markets 
seemed to lead rating agencies in adjustment. From January 2007 to January 2008 
Bear Stearns share price dropped from $171.51 to $71.01. 
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Further examples include; the recent downgrading of major banks,1 the 1997 
Asian financial crisis that spread to Latin America and various other parts of the 
world and the earlier Savings and Loans failures for investors and banks in assessing 
credit risk levels of their portfolios and are designed to complement investor’s 
research. According to Standard and Poor, credit rating agencies can be viewed by 
investors as impartial because they do not directly engage in capital market 
transactions. However whether they are truly impartial is the subject of current 
research. 
An issue that tends to arise when determining the degree of neutrality of 
rating agencies is the manner in which they collect income. There are two methods 
by which agencies receive payment. The first is the issuer pay model where issuers 
pay raters to initiate and maintain a credit rating. The second is the subscription pay 
model where investors pay to access the credit ratings. Both models are criticized 
because they involve conflicts of interest. When the issuers pay for the rating there 
is an incentive for agencies to provide higher ratings to retain their business. Under 
the subscription pay model there is a tendency for agencies to cater to the needs of 
the investor and therefore provide lower ratings. Another drawback of the 
subscription pay model, assuming that credit ratings were established to improve 
the flow of information, is that it is likely to increase informational asymmetry since 
the ratings are released to the party paying for the service as opposed to the public. 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the quality of American corporate 
ratings given by the three most recognized rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch). High quality ratings are forward looking. They impact issue 
prices. Informative rating changes trigger bond prices to move in accordance. Our 
empirical analysis examines whether credit rating reclassifications lead or lag 
changes in prices. Our price measure is the credit default swap (CDS) price linked to 
                                                          
1
 In June 2012 Moody’s downgraded 15 global banks by between 1 and 3 grades. Banks such as 
Citigroup and Goldman Sachs publicly questioned Moody’s methodology after being downgraded 
(Campbell and Moore, 2012). 
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specific issuers. CDS contracts are insurance against default events. We opt for CDS 
prices as they relate more to credit and default risk than yields. 
Our main result is that credit ratings are not forward looking regardless of 
the rating agency. Using data spanning the 2002-2011 period and covering 246 
different issuers rated by the three major rating agencies, we empirically document 
that ratings do not influence credit default swap prices after controlling for 
appropriate factors. This finding supports the hypothesis that rating agencies do not 
contribute to the informational efficiency of the credit market. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use a methodology we 
deem more appropriate for the test. Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) and Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) models are more suitable to test the feedback effects and the 
mutual contributions in the innovations of endogenous series. Second, our analysis 
encompasses the recent financial crisis and dramatic credit rating changes which 
provide more power to our tests. 
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the 
literature about the quality and the evolution of credit rating. Chapter III describes 
the methodology used to test for the quality of credit rating. Chapter IV discusses 
the sample construction and provides descriptive statistics about the issuers 
included in the current study. Chapter V develops the empirically testable 
hypotheses and presents the empirical findings. Chapter VI concludes the thesis. 
 
  
4 
 
Chapter II. Literature Review 
Empirical and analytical studies have been conducted on credit rating 
changes. Literature on the informational value associated with rating 
reclassifications employ a variety of statistical methods and obtain mixed results. 
This thesis focuses on assessing the quality of issuer credit ratings and how quality 
evolves over time. A review of the literature studying different aspects of credit 
rating reclassifications follows. 
 Much of the literature on credit rating changes has adopted some form of 
event study methodology, whether it be the market model, one factor model, two 
factor model or some other variation. Past studies have used both the date of the 
physical rating change and the announcement of change as the event date. 
 In order to measure the informational value of rating reclassifications most 
previous studies have looked to bond yields and stocks prices for the anticipation of 
(or reaction to) a change in credit rating. There are a few that make use of credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads in measuring this effect (Hull et al. 2004; Norden and 
Weber 2004). In this paper we examine the lead-lag relationship between CDS 
spreads and credit rating reclassification. Subsection 2.1 reviews studies which 
analyze ratings quality using monthly bond yields. Subsection 2.2 presents studies 
using weekly and daily bond yields. Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 present studies that use 
equities markets in analyzing ratings quality. Studies in subsections 2.3 and 2.4 
examine monthly and daily stock prices, respectively. Subsection 2.5 reviews 
research studying how ratings quality changes with certain historical events. Lastly, 
studies analyzing CDS market reaction/anticipation to credit ratings changes is 
presented. 
 
2.1 Monthly Bond Yield Effects 
Katz (1974), Grier and Katz (1976), Weinstein (1977) and Hite and Warga 
(1997) contribute to the studies on bond market efficiency by examining monthly 
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bond performance following a credit rating reclassification with event-study 
methods. Katz (1974), Grier and Katz (1976) and Heinke and Steiner (2001) results 
contradict market efficiency whereas Weinstein (1977), Clauretie et al. (1992) and 
Hite and Warga (1997) obtain findings in favor of market efficiency. 
Katz (1974) examines the behavior of the yield to maturity in the 18 months 
surrounding the change in rating. His study is limited to Standard and Poor’s 
investment grade electrical utility bonds assuming this industry would provide the 
most homogeneous operating characteristics so that qualitative differences between 
firms would be contained in bond yields. Using event study methodology he finds no 
anticipatory effect before the change and that full price adjustment to a rating 
reclassification took between 6-10 weeks. 
Weinstein (1977) and Grier and Katz (1976) expand upon the dataset used by 
Katz (1974) by including industrial and public utility bonds with conflicting results. 
Weinstein concludes in favor of bond market efficiency whereas Grier and Katz 
(1976) find evidence against bond market efficiency. Grier and Katz (1976) limit their 
sample to only bonds rated by Standard and Poor’s. They also consider only 
downgrades since very few public utility or industrial bonds were upgraded in the 
selected time interval. In order to separate the effects of a general change in market 
credit worthiness they form a control group in the following way; for every bond 
experiencing a rating change a control bond is found such that it had a similar 
maturity and yield as well as the same initial rating.2 When examining both sectors 
together they find that 80% of the adjustment occurred in the 4 month period 
containing the month of and the 3 months following a rating change. The combined 
sample results indicate that, contrary to expectations, intermediate maturities (10-
19 years) experience the largest dollar adjustment. Shorter term maturities (0-9yrs) 
experience the second largest adjustment and long term maturities (20-30yrs) show 
the least adjustment. They explain this difference between expectations and results 
by looking at the two different sectors individually. Industrial bonds exhibited much 
                                                          
2
 They were also careful to ensure that the control bonds were from the same industry. 
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higher volatilities in prices than did utility bonds. Utility bonds showed no significant 
adjustment for short to intermediate term maturities however long term maturities 
had a 3 month lag in the adjustment. 
Weinstein (1977) uses ratings from the three major rating agencies; Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. He attempts to randomly select bonds that fit the 
following criteria; non-convertible, trade without undetachable warrants or other 
securities, have a fixed coupon rate, denominated in US dollars and are issued by a 
US firm. A potential reason that the results of Weinstein (1977) differ from Grier and 
Katz (1976) is that he considers both upgrades and downgrades, uses monthly 
interest adjusted holding period returns (as opposed to prices or yield) and considers 
a longer event window (24 months). When examining various windows he 
demonstrates that adjustment takes place between 6 months and 18 months prior 
to a rating change with no significant adjustment occurring after reclassification. 
Hite and Warga (1997) restrict their sample to industrial bonds rerated by 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. They use a two year event window and unlike 
Katz (1974), Grier and Katz (1976) and Weinstein (1977), they compare relative 
strengths of abnormal returns of re-ratings that cross the investment grade barrier 
and re-ratings that do not. This is one of the few studies (using bond yields or stock 
returns) that reports significant abnormal returns associated with upgrades. Hite and 
Warga (1997) find significant market reaction for upgrades from non-investment 
grade to investment grade and insignificant results for all other upgrades. They 
conclude that downgrades to non-investment grade, whether from investment or 
non-investment grade, result in the strongest adjustment which takes place during 
the month of the event and 6 months prior to the rating reclassification. 
 
2.2 Weekly/Daily Bond Yield Effects  
Clauretie et al. (1992) and Heinke and Steiner (2001) build on previous 
studies using bond yields by studying the effect of credit watch list additions. The 
first paper uses weekly bond prices from the Merrill Lynch bond pricing service and 
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credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s. Using a market-adjusted returns model they 
conclude, in line with the majority of previous work using bond prices, that 
downgrades result in significant negative abnormal bond returns whereas the effects 
of upgrades are insignificant. The downgrade effect is strongest over the prior two 
week period and the week of the rating change. Furthermore they determine that 
additions to credit watch lists do not provide any informational effects. Parallel to 
Grier and Katz (1976), Clauretie et al. (1992) also find that industrial bonds have 
more pronounced and significant abnormal returns than utility bonds. 
Heinke and Steiner (2001) differ from all other papers because they examine 
the effects on the German Eurobond market of credit rating changes given by 
American credit rating agencies (namely Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s). It is the 
first study that incorporates daily bond prices in the analysis. Bonds are filtered in a 
manner similar to Weinstein (1977) in that only plain vanilla bonds are included in 
the sample. Their results indicate that downgrade announcements and 
announcements of negative watch lists are associated with significant negative 
reaction on the event date and up to 4 trading days afterwards. However they note 
that there is reversion of abnormal returns approximately 3 weeks following the 
announcement. They find no significant results for upgrades or positive watch list 
announcements. Given the few restrictions on their sample Heinke and Steiner 
(2001) are able to make conclusions regarding issuer type3. Bank bonds are found to 
have the smallest reaction while government issued bonds reveal the largest 
reaction. 
There have been several papers devoted to investigating the effect of debt 
re-ratings in equity markets. Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente 
(1982) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) analyze credit rating changes using monthly 
stock returns. Davidson et al. (1987), Followill and Martell (1997), Ederington and 
Goh (1993), Dichev and Piotroski (2001), and Bannier and Hirsch (2010) provide 
similar tests using daily stock returns. 
                                                          
3
 Unlike most studies, they did not restrict their sample by issuer type. 
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2.3 Monthly Stock Returns 
Pinches and Singleton (1978) use a dataset including upgrades and 
downgrades; but study only ratings given by Moody’s. Transportation, industrial and 
public sector bonds are used in their analysis, however only 18 out of the 207 rating 
changes are from the transportation sector. They calculate abnormal returns using a 
one-factor market model focusing on the residuals between the 30 months 
preceding and the 12 months following a rating reclassification. Their main 
conclusion is that abnormally high (low) stock prices occur prior to bond upgrades 
(downgrades). They find stock prices to be relatively stable following rating 
reclassifications. Further, they find a rate changing lag of 1.5 years for all upgrades 
and downgrades that do not occur simultaneously with a company specific event. 
For downgrades accompanied by company specific events the adjustment period is 
less than 6 months. They conclude that equity markets account for all informational 
content associated with a rerating of a firm’s debt in the month containing the 
rerating. 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) criticize the methodological approach taken by 
Pinches and Singleton (1978) and suggest that this is the main reason for contrary 
results. Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) use 3 different methods for evaluating 
abnormal equity price adjustments; the one factor model, two factor cross sectional 
model and a model which “controls for nonevent or extraneous factors by exploiting 
the properties of the two factor model of equilibrium returns and constructing a 
portfolio where each asset is matched to an asset in the event portfolio.” They also 
study re-ratings by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s which could contribute to the 
different results when compared to Pinches and Singleton (1978). Results of their 
study indicate that bond rating changes do provide information to equity holders 
corresponding to stock returns, particularly for downgrades. However they stress 
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that the main contribution of their work is in the critical assessment of 
methodologies used in examining the effect of rating changes of security prices. 
 
2.4 Daily Stock Returns 
Using daily stock returns in their analysis; Followill and Martell (1997), Dichev 
and Piotroski (2001) and Bannier and Hirsch (2010) all find significant negative 
reactions to downgrades. In contrast, Davidson et al. (1987) obtain significant 
reaction to upgrades as well as significant negative anticipatory effects which 
reversed following the announcement of a downgrade. Ederington and Goh (1993) 
produce results that partially support a reactionary response to downgrades. 
However they approach the issue in a different manner than the other studies using 
daily stock returns by including the reason for rating reclassification in their analysis. 
These studies are similar in that they use only ratings given by Moody’s however 
their methodologies, results and datasets differed substantially. 
 Credit rating agencies provide a credit watch list or rating review which is 
designed to give indications of future rating changes as well as a shorter term 
indicator of credit worthiness than actual reclassifications. Followill and Martell 
(1997) test the effects of the announcement of both a review for a downgrade and 
for the announcement of an actual downgrade by Moody’s Investor Services 
Incorporated. For both series of announcements the authors are able to distinguish 
between the wire release day and the financial press reporting day. Their data cover 
the period of December 1985 to May 1988. Followill and Martell (1997) find that 
downgrade announcements provide significant information if they are not preceded 
by a review announcement and that the information content of these downgrade 
announcements does not depend upon reports by the financial press. Specifically, 
announcements regarding reviews for downgrades show significant negative 
abnormal returns on the announcement date. However downgrade announcements 
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only exhibit significant negative returns when they are not preceded by a review 
announcement. 
Similarly Bannier and Hirsch (2010) provide a more comprehensive and 
recent approach in determining the informational content associated with the watch 
list. In a preliminary test they compare cumulative abnormal returns before and 
after the introduction of the Moody’s watch list.4 A significant break in the series is 
found with more negative cumulative abnormal returns in the post watch list period 
than in the pre watch list period. Additionally they consider how the watch list is 
used, testing whether it was used as an instrument to deliver information or as an 
implicit contract between rating agency and firm. They conclude that for a firm with 
high credit worthiness, the watch list is used as a means to convey precise and 
accurate information. Conversely for low credit firms the watch list is used as a tool 
for actively monitoring the given firm. 
In another approach Dichev and Piotroski (2001) report results based on 
cumulative abnormal returns as well as buy and hold returns. They provide insight 
into the relationship between the price effect and the reference entity being a 
parent or subsidiary firm. Another significant strength of Dichev and Piotroski’s work 
is that they use a much richer dataset than previous studies using stock returns. For 
example, comparing the pre-filtered number of re-rating/review announcements 
with the dataset employed by Followill and Martell (1997) we see that Dichev and 
Piotroski (2001) have 50 times the observations of Followill and Martell (1997). They 
report that downgrades are associated with significant negative abnormal returns, 
which are most prominent in the first month following the downgrade but could last 
up to one year. 
Credit rating changes in bond and equity markets should not necessarily 
provide similar market price effects. In an effort to properly explain the effect of 
credit rating changes on equity markets Ederington and Goh (1993) incorporate the 
reason for the rating change announcement in their dataset. They argue that ‘if 
                                                          
4
 On October 1
st
 1991 Moody’s incorporated watchlist assignments as a type of rating action; this is 
where they test for the series break. 
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bonds are downgraded because the rating agencies foresee an increase in leverage 
that will transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders, bond prices should fall 
but equity prices should rise’ and therefore a downgrade resulting from an increase 
in leverage should result in an increase in equity price. They divide the reasons for 
rating changes into the following three categories: 1) Change in firm’s earnings, cash 
flow, financial prospects or performance. 2) Actions that result in a change in 
leverage. 3) Miscellaneous or no reason given. From the standard market model 
they find a negative reaction to downgrades resulting from a revaluation of the 
firm’s or industry’s financial prospects on the event date and the day after the event. 
However no significant reaction is found for all other downgrades. In general they 
conclude that credit rating changes must not be thought of as possessing a 
homogeneous relationship with equity prices. 
Davidson et al. (1987) is the only study relying on daily stock returns and 
reporting robust anticipatory price effects. Their dataset ranged from January 1977 
to December 1981. In line with most other re-ratings literature, no significant 
anticipatory effects are detected with upgrades however they find significant 
negative abnormal equity returns following the announcement. This could be due to 
the reason given by Ederington and Goh (1993) above, meaning these upgrades 
could be due Moody’s foreseeing a decrease in leverage that will transfer wealth 
from shareholders to bondholders and therefore have a negative effect on equity 
prices but a positive effect on bond prices. For downgrades they find both 
anticipatory and reactionary effects. Cumulative abnormal returns for the period 
between the event and 90 days prior to the event are significant and negative, 
whereas the 90 days following the announcement (i.e. day 1 to day 90) has a 
reversal of the post event decreases. 
The previous section reviews literature focusing on the equity markets 
anticipation/response to credit rating changes. Review announcements have 
consistently been shown to provide informational value, specifically for downgrades. 
There have been only a few studies that find a significant reaction/anticipation to 
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upgrades. However, valuable information can be obtained from these few studies as 
they employ methods or controls generally not considered in the literature. 
 
2.5 Other significant works 
 There have been various other works investigating how ratings react to 
events that cause the microstructure of the credit ratings market to change. These 
events include; the addition of Fitch as major market player, regulation fair 
disclosure and Moody’s rating class refinement. In general the focus of these papers 
was to investigate the informational content of credit rating changes after a given 
event. An event that can be shown to have a significant impact on the quality of 
credit ratings will play a key role in analyzing the evolving quality of corporate bond 
ratings. Therefore the following results could provide valuable insight. However our 
dataset does not cover observations before 1999 and hence Moody’s rating class 
refinement will not influence the results. 
 The literature considered in this sub-section can be viewed as addressing 
economic theory regarding market competition. In a highly competitive market 
individual suppliers theoretically have very little or no control over the market price. 
At the other extreme a pure, unregulated, monopolist has considerable control over 
prices as they are the sole supplier in the industry under consideration. The credit 
ratings market in the US can best be described as an oligopoly, a market where a few 
firms dominate all other potential entrants. An increase in competition can 
theoretically lead to the following; decreases in prices, increased quality of offered 
product or service, reduction of information asymmetry and an overall increase in 
economic welfare. The following works essentially address this issue. Becker and 
Milbourn (2011) examine the effects of the Fitch Rating Agency’s entrance (defined 
by their increase in market share of ratings) and Jorion et al. (2005) who study the 
effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
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 In a relevant article, Becker and Milbourn (2011), study the increased 
competitiveness of the credit rating market. They show that Fitch entered the credit 
rating market as a major player in early 2001.5 They calculate market share as the 
total number of ratings issued by Fitch divided by the total number of ratings issued 
by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch combined. They examined how the 
quality of credit ratings changes as Fitch’s market share increases. Using OLS and 
probit specifications, Becker and Milbourn test how the increase in Fitch’s market 
share affect ratings given by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. They find that 
increases in market share are associated with increases in bond and firm ratings. 
They also test of the ability of ratings to predict default using a linear probability 
model where indicators of future default are regressed on ratings and control 
variables. They find a positive relationship between competition and the difference 
between investment grade and speculative grade default probabilities. In other 
words, as competition increases so does the gap between default probability of 
investment and speculative grade bonds. Thus the informational content of ratings 
appears to decrease with increases in competition. 
 If competition truly decreases the informative value of credit ratings then, 
from an economic standpoint, increased regulation seems to be the next best 
solution. According to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Regulation FD) was designed to address the issue of the selective 
disclosure of information in financial markets (SEC filing 2000). Before Regulation FD 
there were apparent problems of issuers releasing non-public information to certain 
investors. After implementation, any non-public information released by an issuer to 
an outside party must be publicly disclosed. Therefore, Regulation FD was designed 
in an effort to reduce information asymmetry among investors in the financial 
market. 
                                                          
5
 They find that by 2001 Fitch had a substantial share of issued ratings and therefore consider 2001 to 
be when they enter the market as a major player. 
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 In order to minimize interference with businesses that are reliant on non-
public information certain groups are exempt from regulation. The four categories 
for exclusion will be briefly outlined in what follows, a more thorough definition can 
be found in the SEC filing on Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading. The first 
exemption is any person who “owes the issuer a duty of trust or confidence,” for 
example an issuer’s accountant (SEC filing 2000). The second category for exemption 
includes persons who engage in business with the issuer and therefore require 
certain non-public information. The third category exempts credit rating agencies. 
Finally, Regulation FD “does not apply to disclosures made in connection with 
securities offering registered under the securities act,” (SEC filing 2000). 
Jorion et al. (2005) address whether the implementation of Regulation FD 
changed the informational value of credit ratings. This is the only work we find that 
directly examines the relationship between Regulation FD and credit ratings. Using 
standard event study methodology, Jorion et al. (2005) calculate abnormal stock 
returns around re-rating dates. They study the period from August 1998 to 
December 2002 using ratings from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. In order 
to analyze the change between periods they split their sample equally into two 
series each containing 26 months. Jorion et al. (2005) find, using the pre-regulation 
period, significant abnormal returns around downgrade events and no significant 
abnormal returns around upgrade events. In the post-regulation period they find 
both upgrades and downgrades to display significant abnormal returns, with 
downgrades showing a stronger response. Thus Jorion et al. (2005) conclude that 
Regulation FD increased the informational effects of rating changes. 
Heflin et al. (2003) address how Regulation FD impacted the flow of financial 
information to capital markets preceding earnings announcements using firm data 
from First Call, CRSP and Compustat databases. They study quarterly data directly 
surrounding Regulation FD. They define their pre Regulation FD sample as the fourth 
quarter of 1999 and the first two quarters of 2000 and the post Regulation FD 
sample as the last quarter of 2000 and the first two quarters of 2001. Using standard 
15 
 
event study methodology they find that absolute cumulative abnormal returns prior 
to earnings announcements are significantly larger pre Regulation FD then they are 
post Regulation FD. Therefore, they conclude that Regulation FD increased the 
efficiency of the flow of financial information. 
 
2.6 CDS Market 
Many previous studies use bond prices or yields in quantifying the 
informational content of credit ratings. However our research makes use of CDS 
spreads as they are already credit spreads. Hull et all (2004) note that to obtain 
credit spreads using bonds, yields and prices must be adjusted which requires an 
assumption regarding an appropriate risk free rate. They conjecture that 
probabilities calculated from historical data are usually less than the default 
probabilities backed out from bond prices. This is consistent with earlier work done 
on this subject. For example Altman (1989) investigates bond mortality and 
performance rates. He finds that corporate bonds, adjusted for impact of defaults, 
have a significant positive return spread above the US Treasury rates. Possible 
explanations for this discrepancy include; mispricing of corporate debt issues, 
liquidity risk and interest rate or reinvestment risk. Altman argues that some 
institutional investors can only legally buy investment grade bonds. Thus non-
investment grade bonds could see reduced demand and inflated prices. Therefore 
CDS spreads should give a better measure of default probability and credit 
worthiness than bond prices or yields. 
Preliminary work by Hull et al. (2004) compares CDS and bond markets and 
analyzes CDS market response to credit rating changes. In order to test the 
relationship between CDS and bond markets they exploit the following theoretical 
relationship; 
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Where CDS = n-year CDS spread, y is the yield on an n-year par yield corporate bond, 
r is the yield on an n-year par yield riskless bond and A is the expected accrued 
interest on the par yield bond at the time of the default. 
From this they estimate that the risk free rate lies between the 5-year swap 
rate and the 5-year Treasury bill rate. To analyze the effect of rating reclassifications 
on the CDS market Hull et al. first, test the change in CDS spreads conditional on 
ratings events then test the probability of a rating event occurring conditional on 
changes in the CDS spread. Their sample covers the period from 1998-2002. Six 
types of credit rating events are considered; downgrades, review for downgrades, 
negative outlooks, upgrades, review for upgrades and positive outlooks. Through 
event study methodology they find that the CDS market anticipates all negative 
credit events and that the CDS market fully adjusts by the day directly following the 
event. Consistent with the majority of previous research Hull et al. find no significant 
effects in relation to positive credit events. 
In a comparable research, Norden and Weber (2004) analyze stock market 
and CDS market responses to credit rating changes. Their sample period spans 1998-
2002, covering more than 1000 reference entities and includes following sectors; 
financials, telecoms, automotives, utilities, chemicals, retailers and other. Using 
event study methodology they show that both stock and CDS markets anticipate 
rating downgrades by approximately 60-90 days. They find asymmetric effects 
where negative rating events produce significant price effects but positive rating 
events do not. Comparing the CDS and equities market, they show that the CDS 
market leads the stock market in anticipating downgrades for all rating agencies. 
When analyzing different rating events within and across agencies they find that 
rating change reviews by S&P and Moody’s provide significant abnormal returns 
whereas Fitch reviews do not. They also note that physical downgrades and 
upgrades do not result in significant anticipation or reaction in either market. Becker 
and Milbourn (2011) note that Fitch acquired a large portion of its market share in 
early 2001 and since Norden and Weber (2004) sample between 1998 and 2002, 
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insignificant effects from Fitch re-ratings can be expected. It is reasonable to assume 
that a sample after mid 2001 would produce consistent results across all 3 ratings 
agencies. 
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Chapter III. Methodology 
 Non-stationary time series frequently arise in the analysis of financial 
markets. Improper estimation leads to inaccurate results and erroneous conclusions. 
However, there are several estimation methods such as vector error correction 
models that allow non-stationary variables and produce reliable results. In the 
following three subsections, methodological procedures and variables used for 
estimation are presented. The first subsection provides a description of vector 
autoregressive estimation, while the second describes vector error correction 
methods. Both subsections include models to be estimated. The final subsection 
defines all variables considered in estimation. 
 
3.1 Vector AutoRegressive Methods  
 When modeling dynamic relationships between more than one variable, 
single equation models are insufficient. A typical method for estimating relationships 
between many endogenous variables is a vector autogressive (VAR) model. In a VAR 
each endogenous variable is regressed on lags of all endogenous variables included 
in the model and a set of control variables. Therefore in estimating a VAR the 
number of equations to be estimated will match the number of endogenous 
variables. Using vector notation a VAR of order p, VAR(p), is given by the following 
equations: 
        ∑           ∑          
 
         
 
    (1) 
       ∑         ∑           
 
         
 
    (2) 
Where    is a vector of exogenous variables,     measures credit ratings and      
measures CDS spreads.    ,  , and    are coefficients on CDS spreads, exogenous 
variables and credit ratings respectively in equation (1).   ,    and   are matrices of 
coefficients to be estimated on lagged credit ratings, lagged CDS spreads and 
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exogenous variables respectively in equation (2).    and    are vectors of 
innovations. 
Equation (1) estimates the impact of lagged CDS spreads and credit ratings 
on current CDS spreads. Equation (2) estimates the impact of lagged CDS spreads 
and credit ratings on credit ratings. Since each equation contains only lags of each 
endogenous variable, simultaneity issues do not arise. Estimating each equation by 
OLS produces both the generalized least squares estimator and the maximum 
likelihood estimator assuming multivariate normal errors (Davidson and Mackinnon, 
2004). We specify the number of lag orders using Akaike and Schwarz criterion.6 
VAR specifications are commonly used to determine the lead lag relationship 
between endogenous variables. This is particularly useful since the focus of this 
research is to determine the quality of Issuer credit ratings. We argue that if CDS 
markets significantly lead rating changes, then the ratings information value and 
hence rating quality are low. 
The focus of our analysis will be to determine the degree of variation in CDS 
spreads that can be explained by credit ratings and the degree of variation in credit 
ratings that can be explained by CDS spreads. For each estimated VAR we analyze 
the lead-lag relationship though variance decomposition. Variance decomposition 
measures the contribution of component shocks on the variance of each 
endogenous variable. This is done by calculating the forecast error of credit ratings 
and CDS spreads for a given horizon and determining the percentage that each 
innovation contributes. 
 
3.2 Vector Error Correction Methods  
 A vector error correction (VEC) model is similar to a restricted VAR, however 
it allows for co-integration among non-stationary endogenous variables. Therefore 
                                                          
6
 If ratings from all agencies were included as endogenous variables in a single VAR severe 
multicollinearity would almost certainly be present, rendering the standard errors and test statistics 
unreliable. Therefore a separate VAR is estimated for each agency. 
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we estimate a VEC model for any cross section where ratings are co-integrated with 
CDS spreads and a VAR for the others. VEC models restrict the long-run behavior of 
the independent variables while allowing for short-run adjustments. The error 
correction representation regresses first differences of each endogenous variable 
on; lags of differenced dependent variables, explanatory variables and an error 
correction term. The error correction term, also known as the equilibrium error, is 
given by the co-integrating vector. A very general representation of the error 
correction model is given in Hamilton (1994). Consider that ratings and CDS spreads 
are I(1) (integrated of order 1) and suppose that they are co-integrated with co-
integrating vector [1, -    . Further suppose the equilibrium error is denoted   . This 
implies that the subsequent three variables are stationary {I(0)};            
      ,                , and               . This leads to the following 
model: 
                                                           
                                              (3) 
 
      
                                                    
                                              (4) 
Equation (3) describes the variation in CDS spreads around their long run 
trend and Equation (4) describes the variation in credit ratings around their long run 
trend.    is a vector of exogenous variables,    and    are vectors of innovations. 
This system is only internally consistent if credit ratings and CDS spreads are co-
integrated. Therefore, assuming CDS spreads are co-integrated with rating changes, 
the above model can be applied. In order to analyze the contribution to price 
discovery we study variance decomposition as done for VAR specifications.  
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3.3 Factors Related to Credit Ratings 
 In this subsection we introduce the estimation variables and their theoretical 
or empirical reasons for inclusion. The majority of previous research assessing the 
relationship between credit rating changes and either stock, bond or CDS prices has 
relied on event study methodology and thus has no extensive list of explanatory 
variables. However, Vassalou and Xing (2004) suggest that when using stock returns 
there should be an adjustment in regards to size, book to market ratio and default 
risk. Naturally these variables, along with a few others, will initially be included in 
the vector of explanatory variables. 
CDS Spread 
 In determining an appropriate benchmark to compare credit re-ratings, the 
previous literature uses three alternatives; bond markets, equity markets or CDS 
markets.7 The CDS market is the best choice as addressed in Norden and Weber 
(2004) as well as Hull et al. (2004)8. Bond and equity prices are noisier measures of 
credit worthiness than CDS prices. We extract CDS spreads from Bloomberg, 
downloading all data available for the period of January 2000 to December 2011. 
Size 
 The main finding of Vassalou and Xing (2004) is that size and book to market 
ratio (BMR in what follows) are directly related to the default risk of a firm. They find 
that default risk decreases monotonically as firm size increases. Therefore smaller 
sized firms can be expected to have a higher default risk than larger sized firms. We 
measure firm size using total assets shown on balance sheet. We download total 
assets from Compustat and Bloomberg, making certain that values are identical. 
                                                          
7
 Market is a term used to include; prices, returns, yields, or spreads from the given market. 
8
 Hull et al. (2004) argue that once a CDS quote is given, the dealer is committed to trading the 
minimum principal at the quoted price, in contrast there is no commitment for a dealer to trade at a 
quoted bond price. They also point out that bond yields need to be transformed into credit spreads 
using a benchmark risk-free rate, whereas CDS spreads are already given as credit spreads and 
require no transformation. 
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Book to Market 
 As mentioned above, Vassalou and Xing (2004) show that the BMR of a firm 
is a key determinant of default risk. They classify ‘value stocks’ as high BMR equities 
and ‘growth stocks’ as low BMR equities. Their findings indicate that BMR is 
positively associated with the level of default risk. Therefore we include BMR in the 
set of independent variables. BMR is available from Compustat and from Bloomberg. 
We extract values from both databases and ensure that there are no discrepancies. 
Credit Spread 
Bloomberg defines a credit spread as the following: “the spread between 
Treasury securities and non-Treasury securities that are identical in all respects. For 
example the yield differential between the U.S. 10 year Treasury bond and the AAA 
rated 10 year corporate bond would be the credit spread.” 
For this analysis credit spread is defined as the difference in yield between 
Moody’s Baa and Aaa Indices. The bonds included in these indices have maturities 
that are more than 20 years, are not susceptible to redemption and maintain their 
respective rating class (Baa or Aaa). In contrast to previously mentioned variables, 
and parallel to subsequent variables, credit spread is a market wide measure in that 
it is time specific as opposed to firm specific. Therefore credit spreads should be 
included as a control variable as they can provide a general sense of market 
conditions. We use Bloomberg to extract Moody’s indices. 
 
Term Spread/Interest Rate 
 Term spread can be defined as the difference between long and short 
maturities of a riskless bond. Both the short term interest rate and term spread can 
be viewed as a signal of economic activity. Short interest rates, controlled by 
monetary authorities, are usually high during expansions and low during recessions. 
Term spreads can be understood in terms of inflation rates. Higher term spreads 
should be associated with higher expectations of inflation. Therefore future 
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economic expansion should be positively related to term spreads. For this analysis, 
term spread is defined as the absolute difference between the 30-year US Treasury 
Bond/Note and the 3-month US Treasury Bond/Note. We extract Treasury note data 
from Bloomberg. 
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Chapter IV. Sample Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 This section describes the process of data collection and gives a description 
of the final sample. The first subsection describes where each data item is acquired 
as well as criteria used in issuer selection. The second subsection provides a detailed 
description of the sample. 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
Due to the lack of quoted bond prices we focus on the relationship between 
CDS spreads and credit ratings. The sample selection procedure is as follows. 
Identifiers for all bonds listed on TRACE database between 2002 and 2010 are 
downloaded; the identifier being used is the 9 digit bond CUSIP. CUSIP numbers are 
provided by CUSIP Global Services (CGS) a firm specifically focused on providing 
identifiers for securities worldwide. CGS provides a 9-digit CUSIP identifier for issuers 
and their financial instruments traded in Canada and the U.S. The 9-digit CUSIP 
structure is designed so that each issuer and type of instrument can be easily 
identified. The first 6 characters represent the unique name of the issuer, where the 
issuer can be a company, municipality or government agency. The 7th and 8th 
characters represent the issue type, either equity or debt. The 9th character checks 
the accuracy of the first 8 characters. All bonds found on TRACE are then matched 
with issuers found on COMPUSTAT using the first 6 characters. 36 129 bonds from 
5717 issuers are listed on TRACE between 2002 and 2010. 13 263 issuers are listed 
on COMPUSTAT between 2003 and 2010. We then merge the datasets and keep 
only bonds issued by firms appearing in both datasets, which gives a sample of 8406 
bonds issued by 1885 firms. Since the focus of this analysis is on the CDS market, 
only unique issuers are kept. Any issuer not domiciled in the US is eliminated; 
reducing the sample to 1720 issuers. Next, CDS tickers for each issuer are 
downloaded; if the issuer does not have an accompanying CDS then the issuer is 
eliminated from the sample leaving 862 unique issuers. For all available CDS tickers, 
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spread data is downloaded for the sample period of 01/01/2000 to 01/01/2012. As 
was the case in the bond market, CDS spreads are not quoted on a daily basis. 
Therefore any CDS instrument missing more than 35% of its total observations is 
eliminated. Further, any CDS instrument with less than 75 total observed spreads is 
removed. This reduces the sample by 370, leaving 492 issuers. Historical ratings for 
each issuer given by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch are then handpicked 
from the Bloomberg Terminal. Any issuer experiencing less than 3 rating changes in 
the CDS sample period (01/01/2000 to 01/01/2012)9 is removed from the sample 
leaving 400 issuers. Finally, after merging all CDS and rating data, all issuer’s that do 
not experience at least two rating changes accompanied by quoted CDS spreads are 
dropped from the sample. The final sample consists of 246 unique issuers. CDS 
spreads and control variables are downloaded from the Bloomberg Terminal. Using 
bond CUSIP numbers, the associated 5 year CDS tickers are downloaded. This 
ensures that the CDS and bond are associated with the same issuer. CDS prices are 
taken from Bloomberg Valuation Service rather than TRACE because Bloomberg’s 
prices are much more comprehensive.10 
 
4.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 This subsection provides descriptive statistics for the fully cleaned dataset. 
The first column of each panel in Table 1 reports the total number of upgrades and 
downgrades in the sample period. Panels A, B and C report statistics from Moody’s 
S&P and Fitch samples respectively. It is quite obvious that firms face more credit 
rating downgrades than upgrades from all three rating agencies. This is consistent 
with previous work, and is more pronounced in larger more recent datasets. For 
example, Weinstein (1977) use a sample containing 72 downgrades and 60 upgrades 
                                                          
9
 This sample is not common for all CDS spreads, it is simply the sample period that was used for the 
data request. As noted the smallest sample contains 163 observations (approximately 7.5 months), 
the largest sample is 2570 observations (approximately 117 months). 
10
 Both sources are assumed to be of reasonable quality. 
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from 1962 to 1974. It is worth noting that the difference between upgrades and 
downgrades can be accounted for by the final year of this sample (1974) where 
there are 26 downgrades and 11 upgrades. Davidson et al. (1987), using data from 
1977 to 1981, obtain a dataset containing 93 downgrades and 69 upgrades. 
Ederington and Goh (1993) collect a dataset with 243 downgrades and 185 upgrades 
from the period spanning from 1984 to 1986. More recent research has the luxury of 
directly downloading time series data for rating changes, whereas early studies rely 
on hand-picked datasets from sources such as Bloomberg and Rating Agency Bond 
Guides and therefore are limited in size.11 This is quite apparent when considering 
recent work by Bannier and Hirsch (2010). Their dataset covers the time period from 
1982 to 2004 and contains 2531 downgrades and 1512 upgrades. When considering 
datasets taken from a variety of time periods, it is clear that downgrading historically 
dominates upgrading. This finding coincides with our dataset. 
[Please insert table 1 about here] 
Table 1 also presents the distribution of ratings changes by number of classes 
changed. A rating change of one class is defined as an upgrade or downgrade to an 
adjacent rating category. As we expected, the majority of rating changes occur over 
one or two categories. Changes across multiple categories occur much more 
frequently in downgrades than in upgrades. An obvious explanation for this is the 
well-defined state of default. When an issuer defaults their credit rating will drop 
immediately to the lowest grade which is default. Downgrades lead to this well-
defined event and its associated cash flow problems. Reasons for upgrades across 
multiple categories may not be as obvious. An example of a multiple class upgrade 
from our sample is XTO Energy. On June 25th 2010 XTO Energy shareholders voted in 
favor of acquisition by Exxon Mobile Corporation (ExxonMobil) making them a 
                                                          
11
 Further some recent researchers do not have access to databases that allow series on rating 
changes to be directly downloaded and therefore must create their own dataset. This was the case 
for the dataset used in this paper. 
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wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil. Moody’s upgraded XTO Energy from Baa2 
to Aaa following this announcement. 
[Please insert table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the firms included in the sample 
and the exogenous variables used in estimation. Panel A reports the distribution of 
firm characteristics described by the first two moments and minimum and maximum 
values. Three characteristics are included; total assets, total debt and total shares 
outstanding.12 Values are reported in hundreds of thousands. The sample clearly 
contains a wide dispersion of firms based on the characteristics reported. This is 
shown by the high standard deviation as well as the large difference between 
minimum and maximum values. This result is consistent across the three 
characteristics examined. 
 Panel B provides the distribution of firms across sectors for the sample. The 
sector is listed in the first column with the number of issuers for each sector listed in 
the second column. The issuers in the sample come from a large variety of sectors. 
However, the distribution across sectors is unbalanced; almost half of the firms are 
from manufacturing, finance and insurance sectors. 
 Panel C describes the two exogenous variables used in estimation (credit 
spread and term spread). For each variable we report the first two moments and the 
minimum and maximum values. Further we provide the estimated correlation 
coefficient between the two variables. Both credit spread and term spread fluctuate 
between small intervals, 0.01 – 4.7 and 0.001 – 6.5 respectively,13 however they 
move in opposite directions as shown by the negative correlation coefficient (-0.94). 
  
                                                          
12
 Data on firm characteristics come from COMPUSTAT, if values are missing Bloomberg data is used 
(when available). 
13
 Values are given as yields. 
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Chapter V. Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
 The following section provides a detailed description of hypotheses and 
results from empirical analysis. The first subsection details hypothesized 
relationships. The second subsection discusses the results using panel data 
methodology. Third, specification tests for VAR and VEC models are reported. The 
fourth and fifth subsections describe results using VAR regression techniques and 
VEC methods respectively. 
 
5.1 Testable Hypotheses 
Given the nature of the dataset several testable hypothesis arise. In this 
subsection two testable hypotheses are introduced and explained. 
    Credit ratings lag CDS spreads in adjusting for credit information. 
    Fitch has the lowest quality of corporate debt ratings. 
 
Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) have examined our first 
hypothesis. Their findings indicate that the CDS market anticipates negative credit 
events. They also find that CDS spreads can successfully predict the probability of 
changes in credit ratings. Therefore it is natural to hypothesize that CDS market 
leads credit ratings in price discovery. We examine variance decomposition to 
determine whether this hypothesis holds true. If credit ratings contribute a greater 
proportion to CDS variance than credit ratings contribute to CDS variance then we 
fail to reject this hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis exploits the results from Becker and Milbourn (2011) 
who find that the entrance of Fitch as a major player in the credit ratings market 
resulted in lower quality of ratings. They measure rating quality in the following 
ways: the percentage of bonds rated AAA, the gap between investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds, correlation between bond yields and credit ratings 
(controlling for other factors) and the ability of credit ratings in predicting default. 
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Since bond issuers prefer higher ratings and rating agencies are paid by the firms 
which they rate, it seems reasonable to conjecture that under highly competitive 
situations agencies tend to assign higher ratings than they would otherwise. To 
measure default prediction they compare ratings and default events occurring 
within 3 years of a rating change. All three tests lead to the conclusion that 
decreased quality of credit ratings is associated with increased competition. 
Therefore it is hypothesized that in order for Fitch to gain its market share they 
necessarily have to inflate their ratings as a means of breaking the barriers of 
entering this market. Variance decomposition is compared across rating agencies in 
order to evaluate this hypothesis. If Fitch has the lowest quality of ratings, their 
ratings should contribute less to CDS spread variance than ratings from Moody’s and 
S&P. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
 The following subsections present the empirical findings of the current 
thesis. We start by documenting the relation between CDS spreads and lagged 
ratings. We then show the cointegration results followed by the VAR and VEC 
estimations of the two dependent variables. 
 
5.2.1 Do ratings Influence the CDS? Preliminary Results 
 To test the relationship between credit ratings and CDS spreads we consider 
two preliminary tests. First, for each cross section included in our sample we 
examine the bivariate correlation coefficient. This provides a rough estimate of the 
linear association between CDS spreads and ratings. Secondly, we test whether 
changes in ratings cause the CDS spread to change through estimating the following 
panel one step ahead model. 
    
                 
             
            (5) 
Where   = Moody’s, S&P, Fitch;   = 1 to 246. 
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Table 3 provides correlations and estimation results from (5). Panels A, B and 
C report one step ahead estimation results using Moody’s S&P and Fitch ratings 
respectively. Standard errors are computed using cross-sectional clustering. They are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s method. We allow for fixed cross-
sectional effects. We specify lag orders using the Akaike criterion. Panel D shows the 
correlations between ratings and CDS spreads. We report the mean correlation, 
standard error and associated p-value for each agency separately. 
[Please insert table 3 about here] 
The estimated models fit the data very well, as confirmed by the high R-
squared values. Coefficient estimates for the first lag of CDS spreads are identical in 
all equations. They are significant and positive with magnitudes very close to 1.14 
Lagged credit ratings have statistically insignificant parameter estimates. In other 
words, yesterday’s ratings are not related to today’s CDS prices. Next we examine 
the relationship between current ratings and current CDS prices using correlation 
coefficients. The calculated correlation coefficient is below 0.1 for ratings issued 
from each agency. This implies that movements in credit ratings are not 
accompanied by movements in CDS prices. We can conjecture from this preliminary 
result that ratings do not influence future CDS prices.15 Credit ratings do not convey 
material information that will cause prices to move. The following sections 
investigate further this issue by testing the mutual influences of both CDS prices and 
credit ratings. We consider both CDS prices and credit ratings as endogenous 
variables. We aim to investigate which among these variables causes the other to 
change. 
                                                          
14
 This result suggests that CDS spreads are probably following a random walk. The next section tests 
for the existence of unit root in the CDS series. 
15
 Ratings Granger cause CDS spreads if Ratings help to forecast CDS spreads, given past CDS spreads. 
Our VAR models estimate jointly; whether Credit Ratings Granger cause CDS spreads and whether 
CDS spreads Granger cause Credit Ratings 
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5.2.2 Are Credit Ratings Co-integrated with CDS Spreads? 
 In this section, we first test whether CDS spreads and credit rating are co-
integrated of order one. As a starting point, we perform Augmented Dickey Fuller 
unit root tests on each endogenous variable. If an issuer experiences very few rating 
changes in the sample period then the unit root test cannot be performed due to 
lack of variation in the variable being tested. We conduct the test on the level and 
include an intercept in the intermediate test equation. The number of lags is 
specified using Schwarz information criterion. We use various subsamples and 
different exogenous variables. The results are robust to all of these alternative 
specifications. 
 Moody’s full sample data allows us to test 121 cross sections for a unit root. 
96 out of 121 cross sections exhibit a unit root. S&P results indicate that 199 out of 
225 cross sections contain unit root processes. Clearly S&P ratings vary significantly 
more than Moody’s ratings. Fitch ratings data allow for 171 unit root tests to be 
executed, where 167 confirm unit root processes. These results indicate that ratings 
data from each agency contain unit root processes. 
 Using full sample results, approximately 70% of our sample firms issue CDS 
whose spreads contain unit root processes. However, this may not be representative 
of the issuers in our sample. Our data request for CDS spreads collects all relevant 
data between January 1st 2000 and December 31st 2011. Many CDS contracts were 
initiated between 2003 and 2005; therefore spread data contained in the first half of 
the sample is much less complete than spread data contained in the second half. 
Results from the second half of the sample should therefore be more representative 
of the true sample. Approximately 85% of CDS spreads in the second half of the 
sample indicate unit root processes. Therefore we confirm our finding in section 
5.2.1 that CDS spreads contain non-stationary unit root processes. 
 We now conduct joint unit root and cointegration tests between CDS prices 
and credit ratings using Johansen’s tests. Table 4 summarizes the results for five 
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possible specifications. Each specification makes different assumptions regarding the 
trend underlying the data. Panels A, B and C provide Moody’s S&P and Fitch related 
results. 
[Please insert table 4 about here] 
S&P full sample results (Panel B) specify approximately 89 ratings series are 
co-integrated with CDS spreads, whereas the first half of the sample specifies that 
approximately 40 series are co-integrated. We report similar results for Moody’s and 
Fitch data. S&P tests provide the strongest support for co-integration between 
ratings and CDS spreads. Concentrating on S&P full sample results; 90 different pairs 
have ratings that are co-integrated with CDS spreads. Moody’s and Fitch ratings 
results, (Panels A and C respectively) indicate that 41 and 68 ratings series are co-
integrated with CDS spreads respectively. Co-integration tests suggest that VAR 
specification may be more appropriate then VEC to assess the mutual influence 
between the CDS prices and the credit ratings. In the next two sections, we will 
present the results for VAR and VEC estimation respectively. 
 
5.2.3 Results from VAR Analysis 
 For each issuer in the sample whose ratings data do not exhibit co-
integration with CDS spreads, we estimate a VAR model as in (1) and (2). Credit 
ratings and CDS spreads are specified as endogenous variables. We estimate ratings 
issued by each agency separately and, as in previous tests, we use variations of 
exogenous variables. Lag length for each VAR is selected through Akaike and 
Schwarz criterion including a maximum of four endogenous lags. For each issuer we 
estimate a separate VAR model. As a robustness check we estimate each VAR using 
five different sample periods; full sample, pre 2006, post 2006, pre 2008 and post 
2008. Given the relative invariability of issuer ratings some cross sections do not lead 
to feasible estimation. This is sensitive to the number of exogenous variables 
included, the number of lags specified and the sample period selection. 
33 
 
 Reported results include two exogenous variables which are credit spread 
and term spread for each VAR model. Short term interest rates are excluded in order 
to mitigate the multicollinearity problem. Since term spread is defined as the 
difference between 30-year US Treasury Bonds and 3-month US Treasury Bonds it 
can certainly be expressed as a linear function of short term interest rates. Table 5 
shows the VAR estimation results. 
[Please insert table 5 about here] 
Panels A, B and C report results using Moody’s, S&P and Fitch credit ratings 
respectively. The first equation in each panel regresses CDS spreads on control 
variables and lags of ratings and CDS spreads. The second equation regresses credit 
ratings on control variables and lags of CDS spreads and credit ratings. The table 
reports output using the full sample period. Mean values are the cross-sectional 
average of coefficient estimates. 
Lagged CDS coefficient estimates from the first equation are significant for 
the first two lags. This reconfirms the autoregressive nature of CDS spreads found 
from the panel data estimation. The coefficient on the first lag of CDS spreads is 
significant in all estimated regressions and has a mean value slightly greater than 1. 
This result is robust to sample period selection and is consistent across ratings 
agencies. The coefficient on the second lag of CDS spreads is estimated as negative 
in approximately 66% of regressions. The mean is approximately -0.1 and is 
significant using S&P and Fitch credit ratings but not Moody’s. Higher order lags of 
CDS spreads are estimated significantly in roughly 50% of equations. However 
coefficients are not consistent for different cross-sections. One exception is the third 
order CDS lag in the first equation for Moody’s VAR (-0.037). The means are similar 
for Moody’s and S&P ratings, however they are insignificant. Therefore CDS spreads 
clearly exhibit strong autoregressive processes of order 2. Lags of credit ratings are 
not highly significant; approximately 23% of first order lags were estimated as 
significant. Significant coefficient values are estimated as positive. A positive 
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coefficient implies that CDS spreads have a positive relation with lower credit 
ratings; therefore a downgrade (upgrades) would result in CDS spreads increasing 
(decreasing).16 Higher order lags of credit ratings produce insignificant results. Mean 
values have high p-values and thus are not very reliable. Therefore credit ratings do 
not seem to influence CDS spreads and CDS spreads do not seem to influence credit 
ratings. Instead, CDS spreads are influenced most by past CDS spreads and credit 
ratings are influenced most by past credit ratings. 
The exogenous variables in the first equation are significant in approximately 
25% of estimated regressions. The mean coefficient estimate for credit spread is 
negative and is significant only when using S&P ratings. The mean coefficient for 
term spread coefficient is insignificant in all specifications. Therefore it appears that 
an increase in the gap between the yield on low and high quality bonds is associated 
with decreases in CDS spreads. This result is puzzling since the credit spread is 
supposed to account for overall economic conditions, where wider credit spreads 
are associated with economic slowdowns and narrow credit spreads are associated 
with economic prosperity. 
The second equation determines what factors influence credit ratings. First 
order lags of CDS spreads are mostly not significant. Higher order lags are also 
relatively insignificant. Therefore it does not appear that past CDS spreads influence 
current credit ratings. First order lags of ratings in the second equation are 
significant and positive. The mean value is significant and close to 1, results are 
consistent across rating agencies. Higher order lags are not statistically significant. 
Therefore credit ratings appear to be influenced by past ratings alone. 
In order to fully examine the lead-lag relationship between CDS spreads and 
credit ratings, we consider the variance decomposition. Variance decomposition 
examines the forecast error variance of each endogenous variable in a VAR. The 
variation in each endogenous variable is separated into contributions from each of 
the two endogenous variables. Using variance decomposition we can determine the 
                                                          
16
 By definition, high numeric credit rating implies low credit quality. 
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proportion of CDS variance explained by credit ratings and CDS itself. If variation in 
CDS spreads is explained by past credit ratings then it can be concluded that ratings 
lead CDS spreads and hence ratings are informative. However if the opposite is true, 
i.e. rating variance is mostly contributed to through CDS, we conclude that CDS 
spreads lead ratings. Table 6, 7 and 8 report 10-period forecast error variance 
decomposition for Moody’s S&P and Fitch respectively. We report contributions to 
variance in percentages. Cross-sectional mean, standard errors and p-values are 
calculated in the same manner as for the VAR output. 
[Please insert table 6 about here] 
The results from Table 6 indicate that Moody’s ratings do not contribute 
much to CDS variation. The first period contributions indicate that 0% of the 
variation in CDS spreads is contributed to by ratings. The result is similar when 
looking at different forecast periods. When examining credit ratings variance, we 
find contributions of CDS spreads to ratings variance are also very small. One period 
forecast results show that Moody’s ratings variation is explained primarily by past 
ratings. However as the forecast period is increased CDS spreads do contribute to a 
small proportion of ratings variance (6.3% in the 10th period). Therefore we conclude 
that the variability in CDS spreads is explained solely by past CDS spreads and that 
the majority of variation in Moody’s ratings is explained by past ratings. We also 
conclude that, on the margin, CDS spreads appear to contribute more to Moody’s 
ratings variance than ratings contribute to CDS variance. 
[Please insert tables 7 and 8 about here] 
S&P (Table 7) and Fitch (Table 8) results are similar to those reported for 
Moody’s. S&P and Fitch ratings both contribute very little to the variation in CDS 
spreads. However, in comparison to Moody’s, CDS contribution to S&P and Fitch 
ratings are approximately twice as large. Similar to Moody’s results, CDS spreads 
contribute to a negligible proportion of variation in S&P and Fitch ratings. These 
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findings lead to two main results. First, CDS spreads are explained entirely by past 
CDS spreads. Second, ratings are explained primarily by past ratings. We further 
suggest that S&P and Fitch ratings may contribute more than Moody’s does to CDS 
variation, though the results are marginal. Also CDS spreads may contribute to 
variations in credit ratings from each agency. 
 
5.2.4 Results for Co-integrated CDS and Credit Ratings 
For any issuer whose ratings show co-integration with CDS spreads we 
estimate a VEC model. We specify the number of co-integrating equations from the 
Johansen Co-integration test. The results are reported in a format identical to that 
used for VAR results. We estimate a difference VEC for each cross section separately 
and for each of the 5 sample periods. We specify lag length for each regression using 
Akaike and Schwarz criterion.17 
Table 9 reports the results from VEC estimation. Panels A, B and C contain 
Moody’s S&P and Fitch results respectively. Each estimated equation contains an 
intercept, two exogenous variables (credit spread and term spread), a co-integration 
parameter and lagged first differences of credit ratings and CDS spreads. The 1st 
equation specifies first differences of CDS spreads as the dependent variable. The 2nd 
specifies first differences of credit ratings as the dependent variable. 
[Please insert table 9 about here] 
Moody’s results (panel A) for the first equation show that lags of CDS spreads 
are significant in most regressions. Coefficients for lagged ratings are insignificant in 
a large proportion of regressions. The results from the first equation indicate that 
CDS spreads are influenced by previous CDS spreads but not by past ratings. This is 
consistent with VAR results. Equation 2 results are not highly significant. Lagged CDS 
                                                          
17
 Lags order is therefore not consistent over cross sections, hence the difference in total estimated 
coefficients. (See Table 9). We specify a maximum of 4 lags. 
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spreads are insignificant in the most regressions and lagged credit ratings are 
insignificant in nearly all estimated regressions. This suggests that ratings are not 
influenced by prior CDS spreads or by past credit ratings. 
S&P results (panel B) for equation 1 show coefficients for lagged CDS spreads 
are significant. Therefore CDS spreads are influenced by past CDS spreads. 
Coefficients for lagged credit ratings are significant in approximately 25% of 
estimated regressions. Therefore CDS spreads are not highly influenced by past 
credit ratings. Exogenous variables are significant in only 40% of estimated 
regressions. Equation 2 results are similar to those obtained using Moody’s ratings. 
CDS spread and credit ratings coefficients are not significantly different from zeros. 
Therefore S&P VEC estimation results indicate that CDS spreads are influenced by 
past CDS spreads alone and that past CDS spreads do not influence credit ratings. 
This is consistent with VAR results. However, contrary to VAR results, VEC results 
indicate current credit ratings are not significantly influenced by their prior value.  
Fitch results (panel C) for equation 1 indicate significant coefficients on the 
first two lags of CDS spreads and significant. Coefficients for lags of credit ratings are 
not significant in the majority of regressions. This coincides with earlier results. 
Therefore it appears that CDS spreads are influenced only by past CDS spreads. Term 
spread and credit spread coefficients do not appear to be significant. Identical to 
Moody’s and S&P results, Fitch Equation 2 estimates are insignificant. This implies 
that credit ratings are not influenced by prior CDS spreads or prior credit ratings.  
To further examine the lead-lag relationship between CDS spreads and credit 
ratings we analyze forecast error variance decomposition for each VEC. The results 
are presented in Tables 10, 11 and 12 for Moody’s, S&P and Fitch respectively. The 
formats of Tables 10-12 are identical to those of Tables 6-8 (variance decomposition 
of VAR). 
[Please insert table 10 about here] 
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Table 10 reports variance decomposition results from Moody’s VEC 
estimation. The results are similar to those found from VAR variance decomposition. 
Moody’s ratings do not contribute to the variation in CDS spreads and CDS spreads 
contribute a marginal portion to ratings variance. The first period contribution of 
CDS spreads to ratings is larger in comparison to VAR results. The contribution is 
however still less than 1%. Therefore VEC variance decomposition results confirm 
our previous findings that CDS spread variability is completely explained by past CDS 
spreads and that credit ratings variation is primarily explained by past credit ratings. 
[Please insert tables 11 and 12 about here] 
Results for S&P and Fitch are again identical to Moody’s results. The first 
period contributions indicate that 0% of the variation in CDS spreads is explained by 
credit ratings. This proportion increases slightly when the forecast period is 
increased. When we examine ratings variance we find similar results. Our results 
show that variations in S&P and Fitch ratings are explained almost entirely by their 
past values. Thus we find that VEC variance decomposition results confirm the two 
major results found from VAR results; CDS spreads are explained entirely by past 
CDS spreads and ratings are explained primarily by past ratings. We note however 
that for the three tables 10, 11 and 12 mean values of the sixth column are 
systematically higher than those in the fourth column. In other words the CDS prices 
contribution to credit rating formation is always higher than the credit rating 
contribution to the CDS price formation even if both are economically marginal. The 
same conclusion was reached from Tables 6, 7 and 8. 
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Chapter VI. Conclusion 
This research examines the relationship between credit ratings and CDS 
spreads in order to assess the quality of corporate ratings. A rating agency’s primary 
responsibility is to provide information regarding the credit worthiness of their rated 
issuers and securities. This reduces uncertainty while increasing the information flow 
between investors and issuers. We question whether there is any information 
content in credit ratings that is not already publicly available. Previous research on 
bond rating changes focuses on bond and equity reactions. Most find significant 
effects associated with only downgrades. A few studies have incorporated CDS 
markets into their analysis. We prefer CDS spreads instead of bond yields for two 
reasons. First data on CDS prices for specific issuers are more reliable than data on 
bonds prices. Bond yields are more likely to be stale since for most bonds the market 
is completely illiquid. Second, CDS prices are more closely related to credit and 
default risk than yields. 
In contrast to previous studies which use event studies, we specify VAR and 
VEC models. A major advantage of estimating VAR and VEC models is the ability to 
study the lead-lag relationship between endogenous variables. We initially assume 
that credit ratings are co-integrated with CDS spreads. However Johansen’s Co-
integration test results indicate that co-integration is present in less than half of the 
cross sections. For issuer’s whose ratings exhibit co-integration with CDS spreads we 
employ VEC methods. VAR methods are used for issuer’s whose ratings are not co-
integration with CDS spreads. 
VAR results confirm that CDS spreads and credit ratings are greatly 
influenced by their respective histories. VEC results for CDS spreads are identical. We 
analyze the variance decomposition for VAR and VEC models in order to understand 
the lead-lag relationship between credit ratings and CDS spreads or the relative 
contribution of each variable in the innovation of both endogenous variables. We 
find that CDS spreads are explained almost entirely by previous CDS spreads and 
that credit ratings are explained primarily by past credit ratings. Further, we find that 
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S&P ratings contribute slightly more to CDS variation than Moody’s and Fitch ratings. 
Therefore S&P ratings may be more informative than Moody’s and Fitch ratings. 
Our VAR and VEC models show that credit ratings and CDS spreads are, for 
the most part, unrelated. Therefore credit ratings provide little information value to 
financial market participants. In regards to any differences in quality amongst 
agencies, we conclude that S&P may provide higher quality ratings than Moody’s 
and Fitch. However this difference is small or even negligible. These findings are not 
surprising given the speculation regarding the quality of credit ratings. It seems likely 
that the majority of information conveyed through credit ratings is publicly available. 
The results have serious implications for financial markets. If credit ratings do 
not provide investors with any information that is not already publicly available then 
why should they be considered? Firms issuing bonds generally require their bonds to 
be rated in order for them to be traded. Furthermore, the price or yield at which 
bonds trade is a function of the issuer’s credit standing. Therefore inflated (deflated) 
credit ratings can lead to deflated (inflated) bond yields. 
Regardless of ratings accuracy many institutional investors and portfolio 
managers are required to hold only bonds rated at investment grade or higher. The 
inability of rating agencies to anticipate the effects of financial crises has led to 
severe criticism of ratings quality. Our research suggests that perhaps this criticism is 
warranted. Further research could expand on this work by incorporating a larger 
number of issuers in the sample with quoted CDS spreads who experience several 
rating changes. 
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Table 1. Total Upgrades/Downgrades 
 
This table provides information on the distribution of upgrades and downgrades by the three rating agencies included in the study; Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. All rating changes occur between January 1st 2000 and December 31st 2011. An upgrade is defined as any positive 
change in credit rating. A downgrade is defined as any negative change in credit rating. Panels A,B and C report the distribution of; all rating 
reclassifications, downgrades and upgrades respectively. The first column of each panel lists the number of rating categories changed in the 
rating change. The second, third and fourth column provide the number of reclassifications from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch respectively. 
 
Number 
Classes 
Changed 
Panel A. Moody’s Panel B. S&P Panel C. Fitch 
Total Upgrades Downgrades Total Upgrades Downgrades Total Upgrades Downgrades 
1 271 108 163 651 204 447 464 170 294 
2 87 14 73 186 48 138 108 35 70 
3 17 3 14 44 7 37 30 7 23 
4 2 1 1 21 4 17 13 4 9 
5 3 2 1 18 8 10 4 1 3 
6 1 0 1 6 5 1 4 1 3 
7 0 0 0 8 6 2 1 0 1 
8 1 1 0 4 2 2 2 1 1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
>14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2. Issuer Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for issuer’s contained in the sample and exogenous 
variables used in estimation. Panel A describes the sample; minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation of issuer total assets, total debt and shares outstanding are reported. All 
values are in hundred thousands. Panel B reports the different sectors included in the issuer 
sample. NAICS classes were downloaded from naics.com using NAICS codes obtained from 
Bloomberg. The first column lists the different categories, the second column lists the 
percentage of issuers in the sample belonging to each category. Panel C provides the minimum, 
maximum, mean and standard deviation of the two exogenous variables (Credit Spread and 
Term Spread) as well as the correlation between them. 
 
Panel A. Issuer Descriptives 
Statistic Total Assets Total Debt 
Shares 
Outstanding 
Mean 22688.99 11214.98625 479.19 
Min. 20.88 0.06 0.001 
Max. 1121192 835300 8069.54 
Stdev. 93266.71 39798.45 752.13 
Panel B. Issuer NAICS Classification 
Industry 
Proportion of 
Issuers   
Manufacturing 0.32  
 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.01  
 
Utilities 0.11  
 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 0.05  
 
Construction 0.03  
 
Wholesale Trade 0.02  
 
Retail Trade 0.09  
 
Transportation and Warehousing 0.04  
 
Information 0.08  
 
Finance and Insurance 0.17  
 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.02  
 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.03  
 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
0.01  
 
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.01  
 
Accommodation and Food Services 0.02  
 
Panel C - Exogenous Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Statistic Credit Spread Term Spread  
mean 2.54 2.32  
std dev 1.57 2.03  
min 0.01 0.00  
max 4.69 6.49  
correlation coefficient -0.94   
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Table 3. One Step Ahead Estimation of CDS using lagged ratings 
 
This table provides results from regressing CDS spreads on lagged credit ratings. Panels A, B and 
C report results using Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings respectively. We estimate the panels with 
cross-section fixed effect. We use the Akaike criterion to set the number of lags for both the 
ratings and CDS variables. For each variable; coefficient estimates, standard errors and p-values 
are calculated and shown in columns 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Standard errors are computed 
using White cross-section correction. Further, we report correlations between ratings and CDS 
spreads, shown in Panel D. For each issuer in the sample, we estimate the correlation between 
ratings and CDS spreads. We calculate and report the average correlation for ratings from each 
agency separately as well as the standard error of the mean and associated p-value. 
 
Panel A. Moody's Ratings 
Variable Estimate Std. Error P-value 
Constant 2.270 1.074 0.03 
Ratings (-1) -0.149 0.120 0.21 
CDS spread (-1) 0.997 0.003 0.00 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 
  
Akaike Criterion 9.476   
Log likelihood -688869 
  
Panel B. S&P Ratings 
Variable Estimate Std. Error P-value 
Constant -1.822 1.208 0.13 
Ratings (-1) 0.259 0.154 0.09 
CDS spread (-1) 0.998 0.002 0.00 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 
  
Akaike Criterion 9.643   
Log likelihood -1542258 
  
Panel C. Fitch Ratings 
Variable Estimate Std. Error P-value 
Constant 1.103 0.629 0.08 
Ratings (-1) -0.059 0.090 0.51 
CDS spread (-1) 0.998 0.003 0.00 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996   
Akaike Criterion 9.145   
Log likelihood -1204120   
Panel D. Correlation Between Ratings and CDS  
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Mean 0.064 0.083 0.097 
SE(mean) 0.042 0.043 0.045 
p-value 0.07 0.03 0.02 
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Table 4. Johansen Co-integration Tests 
 
This table provides results from Johansen’s Co-integration tests between CDS spreads and 
ratings from each agency. Panel A reports results for Moody’s, panel B provides S&P results and 
panel C reports Fitch results. The results are for the entire sample. The first column in each 
panel lists the number of co-integrating vectors. Columns 2 through 6 provide the tests results 
allowing for different assumptions regarding the trend underlying the data. Columns 2 and 3 
assume that there is no deterministic trend in the data, column 2 results specify no intercept 
and no trend in the co-integrating equation and test VAR whereas column 3 results estimate an 
intercept in the co-integrating equation. Columns 4 and 5 allow for a deterministic trend in the 
underlying data. Column 4 results are based on a co-integrating equation and test VAR each 
estimated with an intercept and no trend, whereas the fifth column estimates assume there is a 
trend factor in the co-integrating equation. Column 5 reports results allowing for a quadratic 
deterministic trend in the underlying data. An intercept and trend are entered into the co-
integrating equation, a linear trend factor is included in the test VAR. 
 
Panel A. 
Moody's Full 
Sample 
Results 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Allow For 
Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Quadratic 
Deterministic Trend 
in Data 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Vectors 
No Intercept 
No Trend in CE 
or test VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE - No 
Intercept in VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE 
and Test VAR 
Intercept and 
Trend in CE - No 
Trend in VAR 
Intercept and Trend 
in CE – Linear Trend 
in VAR 
0 206 207 199 208 198 
1 41 33 26 34 24 
2 0 7 22 5 25 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B. S&P 
Full Sample 
Results 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Allow For 
Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Quadratic 
Deterministic Trend 
in Data 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Vectors 
No Intercept 
No Trend in CE 
or test VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE - No 
Intercept in VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE 
and Test VAR 
Intercept and 
Trend in CE - No 
Trend in VAR 
Intercept and Trend 
in CE – Linear Trend 
in VAR 
0 157 163 149 171 150 
1 88 70 58 61 38 
2 2 14 40 15 59 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel C. Fitch 
Full Sample 
Results 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Assume No 
Deterministic 
Trend 
Allow For 
Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Linear 
Deterministic 
Trend in Data 
Allow For Quadratic 
Deterministic Trend 
in Data 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Vectors 
No Intercept 
No Trend in CE 
or test VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE - No 
Intercept in VAR 
Intercept, No 
Trend in CE 
and Test VAR 
Intercept and 
Trend in CE - No 
Trend in VAR 
Intercept and Trend 
in CE – Linear Trend 
in VAR 
0 179 190 175 190 168 
1 67 48 39 50 32 
2 1 9 33 7 47 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5. VAR Estimation Results 
 
This table reports VAR estimation results done in levels. Panel A shows estimates from the model containing Moody’s ratings and CDS spreads as 
endogenous variables. Panel B provides results from specifying S&P ratings and CDS spreads as endogenous variables and Panel C reports estimates 
from a model specifying Fitch ratings and CDS spreads as endogenous variables. All models include two control variables; credit spread and term 
spread. Credit spread is defined as the difference in yield between prime rated bonds (AAA, Aaa) and investment grade bonds (BBB-, Baa3). Term 
spread is defined as the difference in yield between 30-year US Treasury Bond/Note and the 3-month US Treasury Bond/Note. Equation 1 in each 
panel specifies CDS spreads as the dependent variable, equation 2 specifies ratings as the dependent variable. Mean values are calculated by taking 
the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. Standard errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total 
observations. P-values are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. 
 
Panel A. Moody's Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean 1.036 -0.0808 -0.0352 0.000325 5.082 -18.266 21.526 -9.102 -1.934 -0.852 
SE(mean) 0.0311 0.0585 0.0307 0.0317 3.0262 14.682 16.12 9.336 1.631 1.827 
P-value 0.000 0.180 0.270 0.992 0.100 0.226 0.202 0.351 0.241 0.643 
% significant 1 0.913 0.467 0.455 0.245 0.087 0.2 0.0909 0.327 0.224 
# of positive and significant 49 7 2 2 11 1 2 0 4 2 
# of negative and significant 0 14 5 3 1 1 1 1 12 9 
Total 49 23 15 11 49 23 15 11 49 49 
Equation 2 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean -1.02E-08 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.000039 0.995 0.00107 0.00284 0.002996 0.00408 0.00573 
SE(mean) 0.000154 0.000281 0.000217 0.00024 0.000938 0.000807 0.00162 0.00116 0.00135 0.0067 
P-value 1.000 0.481 0.480 0.873 0.000 0.199 0.099 0.026 0.004 0.396 
% significant 0.408 0.087 0.0667 0.0909 1 0 0 0 0.367 0.34 
# of positive and significant 11 1 0 1 49 0 0 0 12 11 
# of negative and significant 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 
Total 49 23 15 11 49 23 15 11 49 47 
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Panel B. S&P Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean 1.095 -0.136 -0.028 -0.018 6.349 -9.064 0.914 -1.578 -1.280 0.786 
SE(mean) 0.020 0.033 0.019 0.019 3.566 8.102 7.468 2.769 0.397 0.819 
P-value 0.000 0.000108 0.148 0.368 0.078 0.267 0.903 0.573 0.002 0.339 
% significant 1 0.794 0.558 0.643 0.228 0.190 0.154 0.071 0.238 0.267 
# of positive and significant 101 16 10 4 22 4 2 0 2 6 
# of negative and significant 0 34 19 14 1 8 6 2 22 21 
Total 101 63 52 28 101 63 52 28 101 101 
Equation 2 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean -3.70E-04 -6.63E-05 2.61E-05 5.36E-05 9.96E-01 -5.8E-04 2.41E-03 4.04E-03 4.65E-03 3.54E-03 
SE(mean) 0.000409 0.0000911 0.0000943 0.0000755 0.000784 0.00114 0.00107 0.000941 0.00114 0.00183 
P-value 0.368 0.469 0.783 0.483 0.000 0.614 0.028 0.0002 0.0001 0.057 
% significant 0.337 0.159 0.135 0.0357 1 0 0 0 0.347 0.313 
# of positive and significant 25 3 3 1 101 0 0 0 25 25 
# of negative and significant 9 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 
Total 101 63 52 28 101 63 52 28 101 99 
Panel C. Fitch Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean 1.084 -0.105 -0.0372 0.0135 2.285 -2.417 3.851 -8.861 -1.063 0.872 
SE(mean) 0.025 0.037 0.016 0.026 1.502 5.075 3.783 5.748 0.557 0.918 
P-value 0.000 0.007 0.025 0.615 0.132 0.636 0.314 0.140 0.060 0.345 
% significant 1 0.778 0.622 0.579 0.225 0.185 0.067 0.263 0.213 0.238 
# of positive and significant 80 14 9 5 14 5 1 3 3 4 
# of negative and significant 0 28 19 6 4 5 2 2 14 15 
Total 80 54 45 19 80 54 45 19 80 80 
Equation 2 CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) Ratings(-1) Ratings(-2) Ratings(-3) Ratings(-4) Credit Spread Term Spread 
Mean 8.111E-05 -6.775E-05 4.679E-05 -0.00009 0.99096 0.00385 0.00397 0.00687 0.004873 0.00187 
SE(mean) 0.000176 0.000373 0.000179 9.55E-05 3.27E-03 0.00383 0.00151 0.00160 0.00258 0.00202 
P-value 0.646 0.856 0.795 0.347 0.000 0.319 0.0118 0.0004 0.0622 0.359 
% significant 0.263 0.148 0.156 0.105 1 0.0370 0 0 0.278 0.291 
# of positive and significant 13 5 2 1 80 2 0 0 17 18 
# of negative and significant 8 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Total 80 54 45 19 80 54 45 19 79 79 
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Table 6. Moody’s VAR Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports output for variance decomposition of Moody’s VAR estimates. The first 
column lists the forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean 
values are calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. 
Standard errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. 
P-values are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports 
statistics on CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS 
spreads and the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The 
fifth column reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit 
rating variance explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. The total number of 
estimated equations is 48. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
CR 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
Mean 18.207 100.000 0.000 0.046 0.163 99.837 
SE(mean) 4.463 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.101 0.101 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 
2 period avgs. 
Mean 25.466 99.947 0.053 0.064 0.431 99.569 
SE(mean) 6.090 0.027 0.027 0.009 0.149 0.149 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.006 0.000 
3 period avgs. 
Mean 31.292 99.919 0.081 0.078 0.923 99.077 
SE(mean) 7.362 0.034 0.034 0.010 0.282 0.282 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.002 0.000 
4 period avgs. 
Mean 36.123 99.887 0.113 0.090 1.562 98.438 
SE(mean) 8.408 0.050 0.050 0.012 0.475 0.475 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.000 
5 period avgs. 
Mean 40.231 99.859 0.141 0.100 2.297 97.703 
SE(mean) 9.288 0.060 0.060 0.013 0.697 0.697 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.000 
6 period avgs. 
Mean 43.893 99.833 0.167 0.110 3.086 96.914 
SE(mean) 10.080 0.071 0.071 0.015 0.934 0.934 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.002 0.000 
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Table 6. Moody’s VAR Variance Decomposition (Continued) 
7 period avgs. 
Mean 47.273 99.807 0.193 0.118 3.898 96.102 
SE(mean) 10.828 0.081 0.081 0.016 1.174 1.174 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.000 
8 period avgs. 
Mean 50.407 99.780 0.220 0.126 4.712 95.288 
SE(mean) 11.535 0.092 0.092 0.017 1.410 1.410 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.000 
9 period avgs. 
Mean 53.327 99.750 0.250 0.134 5.512 94.488 
SE(mean) 12.197 0.104 0.104 0.018 1.637 1.637 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 
10 period avgs. 
Mean 56.055 99.718 0.282 0.141 6.289 93.711 
SE(mean) 12.820 0.117 0.117 0.019 1.851 1.851 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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Table 7. S&P VAR Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports output for variance decomposition of S&P VAR estimates. The first column 
lists the forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean values 
are calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. 
Standard errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. 
P-values are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports 
statistics on CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS 
spreads and the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The 
fifth column reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit 
rating variance explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. The total number of 
estimated equations is 116. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
CR 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
Mean 16.341 100.000 0.000 0.068 0.219 99.781 
SE(mean) 3.657 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.085 0.085 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 
2 period avgs. 
Mean 25.201 99.809 0.191 0.096 0.711 99.289 
SE(mean) 6.040 0.085 0.085 0.011 0.200 0.200 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.000 
3 period avgs. 
Mean 32.402 99.705 0.295 0.118 1.180 98.820 
SE(mean) 8.028 0.136 0.136 0.014 0.301 0.301 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 period avgs. 
Mean 38.570 99.629 0.371 0.135 1.683 98.317 
SE(mean) 9.705 0.171 0.171 0.016 0.407 0.407 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 period avgs. 
Mean 43.894 99.566 0.434 0.151 2.225 97.775 
SE(mean) 11.126 0.198 0.198 0.018 0.519 0.519 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 period avgs. 
Mean 48.626 99.514 0.486 0.166 2.790 97.210 
SE(mean) 12.354 0.219 0.219 0.020 0.632 0.632 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 7. S&P VAR Variance Decomposition (Continued) 
7 period avgs. 
Mean 52.905 99.466 0.534 0.179 3.368 96.632 
SE(mean) 13.433 0.237 0.237 0.021 0.743 0.743 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 period avgs. 
Mean 56.794 99.419 0.581 0.191 3.951 96.049 
SE(mean) 14.392 0.253 0.253 0.023 0.851 0.851 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 period avgs. 
Mean 60.352 99.373 0.627 0.202 4.534 95.466 
SE(mean) 15.250 0.267 0.267 0.024 0.956 0.956 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 period avgs. 
Mean 63.631 99.325 0.675 0.213 5.111 94.889 
SE(mean) 16.024 0.282 0.282 0.025 1.057 1.057 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 8. Fitch VAR Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports output for variance decomposition of Fitch VAR estimates. The first column 
lists the forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean values 
are calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. 
Standard errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. 
P-values are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports 
statistics on CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS 
spreads and the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The 
fifth column reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit 
rating variance explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. The total number of 
estimated equations is 80. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
CR 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
Mean 16.124 100.000 0.000 0.078 0.731 99.269 
SE(mean) 3.590 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.344 0.344 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 
2 period avgs. 
Mean 23.263 99.807 0.193 0.108 0.936 99.064 
SE(mean) 5.065 0.086 0.086 0.017 0.393 0.393 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.020 0.000 
3 period avgs. 
Mean 28.906 99.733 0.267 0.132 1.409 98.591 
SE(mean) 6.237 0.110 0.110 0.020 0.477 0.477 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.000 
4 period avgs. 
Mean 33.643 99.645 0.355 0.151 2.027 97.973 
SE(mean) 7.218 0.128 0.128 0.023 0.609 0.609 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 
5 period avgs. 
Mean 37.775 99.593 0.407 0.168 2.721 97.279 
SE(mean) 8.080 0.141 0.141 0.026 0.777 0.777 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 
6 period avgs. 
Mean 41.536 99.559 0.441 0.184 3.441 96.559 
SE(mean) 8.874 0.148 0.148 0.028 0.958 0.958 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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Table 8. Fitch VAR Variance Decomposition 
7 period avgs. 
Mean 45.046 99.536 0.464 0.198 4.165 95.835 
SE(mean) 9.628 0.153 0.153 0.030 1.139 1.139 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 period avgs. 
Mean 48.331 99.517 0.483 0.211 4.875 95.125 
SE(mean) 10.349 0.157 0.157 0.032 1.314 1.314 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 period avgs. 
Mean 51.427 99.501 0.499 0.223 5.559 94.441 
SE(mean) 11.043 0.160 0.160 0.034 1.479 1.479 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 period avgs. 
Mean 54.373 99.486 0.514 0.235 6.212 93.788 
SE(mean) 11.715 0.163 0.163 0.036 1.635 1.635 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 9. VEC Estimation Results 
 
This table provides results from VEC estimation including Ratings and CDS spreads as endogenous variables. Panel A reports results from Moody’s, 
Panel B reports S&P results and Panel C provides Fitch results. Each regression includes a constant and two exogenous variables; credit spread and 
term spread. Equation 1 specifies the first difference of CDS spreads as the dependent variable, equation 2 specifies first differenced credit ratings as 
the dependent variable. For each parameter mean, standard error, p-value, percentage significant, percentage positive and significant and percentage 
negative and significant are reported. Mean values are calculated by taking the arithmetic average of point estimates. Standard errors are calculated 
by dividing the standard deviation of the parameter by the square root of the number of estimated coefficients. P-values are calculated using the 
Student’s t-distribution. 
 
Panel A. Moody's Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean -0.0102 0.229 0.0329 0.000833 0.00497 -2.140 9.742 -3.617 2.716 5.975 -1.426 -1.049 
SE(mean) 0.00149 0.0344 0.0256 0.0281 0.0311 4.747 4.229 7.213 2.950 1.778 0.413 1.395 
P-value 1.37E-08 2.46E-08 0.208 0.977 0.875 0.654 0.027 0.621 0.367 0.002 0.001 0.456 
% significant 0.813 0.875 0.735 0.609 0.636 0.250 0.294 0.217 0.091 0.396 0.354 0.438 
# of positive and significant 1 36 17 7 7 7 8 2 2 18 1 3 
# of negative and significant 38 6 8 7 7 5 2 3 0 1 16 18 
Total 48 48 34 23 22 48 34 23 22 48 48 48 
Equation 2 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean -4.37E-06 0.00016 6.21E-05 2.84E-05 0.000273 -0.0113 -0.00973 -0.01611 -0.00771 -0.0289 0.00459 0.00974 
SE(mean) 2.19E-05 0.000150 0.000122 9.13E-05 0.000206 0.00399 0.00358 0.00730 0.003262 0.0248 0.00374 0.00582 
P-value 0.842 0.281 0.614 0.758 0.199 0.007 0.010 0.038 0.027 0.249 0.226 0.101 
% significant 0.354 0.229 0.059 0.261 0.182 0.021 0.029 0.043 0 0.125 0.083 0.104 
# of positive and significant 12 7 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 
# of negative and significant 5 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 1 
Total 48 48 34 23 22 48 34 23 22 48 48 48 
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Table 9 - VEC Estimation Results (Continued) 
Panel B. S&P Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean -0.00916 0.221 0.0402 0.0237 -0.0160 11.289 8.043 44.026 9.619 7.673 -1.838 0.0519 
SE(mean) 0.00115 0.0208 0.0128 0.0100 0.016 5.573 5.596 36.803 11.801 1.747 0.414 1.645 
P-value 3.98E-12 1.20E-17 0.002421 0.021 0.331 0.046 0.155 0.236 0.421 3E-05 2.51E-05 0.975 
% significant 0.82417582 0.9011 0.701299 0.40625 0.6875 0.26374 0.24675 0.21875 0.25 0.40659 0.40659 0.41758 
# of positive and significant 6 73 39 18 10 22 10 11 4 36 1 3 
# of negative and significant 69 9 15 8 12 2 9 3 4 1 36 35 
Total 91 91 77 64 32 91 77 64 32 91 91 91 
Equation 2 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean 1.74E-05 3.06E-06 -6.40E-06 5.64E-06 -0.000156 -0.00527 -0.00486 0.00398 -0.00885 -0.00174 0.000795 0.00217 
SE(mean) 6.03E-06 6.59E-05 4.56E-05 8.52E-05 0.000133 0.00136 0.00178 0.00660 0.003313 0.00254 0.000582 0.00378 
P-value 0.00491 0.963 0.889 0.947 0.247 0.000203 0.00791 0.548 0.0118 0.496 0.176 0.567 
% significant 0.440 0.242 0.169 0.234 0.219 0.011 0.013 0.063 0.063 0.088 0.077 0.132 
# of positive and significant 29 15 7 6 3 1 1 2 0 3 5 6 
# of negative and significant 11 7 6 9 4 0 0 2 2 5 2 6 
Total 91 91 77 64 32 91 77 64 32 91 91 91 
Panel C. Fitch Full Sample Results 
Equation 1 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean -0.00800 0.213 0.0534 0.00118 -0.00756 -6.675 2.871 0.651 -1.738 5.336 -1.300 -0.304 
SE(mean) 0.00133 0.0265 0.0180 0.0126 0.0148 7.496 1.309 1.208 3.857 2.221 0.509 2.288 
P-value 8.8716E-08 2E-11 0.004321 0.925406 0.614104 0.37642 0.0323 0.59223 0.6556 0.01905 0.01299 0.89459 
% significant 0.866 0.881 0.793 0.442 0.552 0.194 0.172 0.096 0.172 0.284 0.269 0.403 
# of positive and significant 5 53 35 13 8 12 7 1 2 19 1 2 
# of negative and significant 53 6 11 10 8 1 3 4 3 0 17 25 
Total 67 67 58 52 29 67 58 52 29 67 67 67 
Equation 2 
Cointegrating 
Eq. 
CDS(-1) CDS(-2) CDS(-3) CDS(-4) 
RATINGS 
(-1) 
RATINGS 
(-2) 
RATINGS 
(-3) 
RATINGS  
(-4) 
Credit 
Spread 
Term 
Spread 
Constant 
Mean 2.79E-05 5.20E-05 0.000172 -0.000144 4.10E-05 -0.00536 -0.00302 -0.00649 -0.000779 -0.00241 0.000280 0.0109 
SE(mean) 2.27E-05 7.48E-05 7.61E-05 4.69E-05 5.43E-05 0.00140 0.00201 0.00230 0.00312 0.00246 0.000595 0.00599 
P-value 0.22442247 0.48937 0.028057 0.003402 0.45634 0.0003 0.13766 0.00689 0.804769 0.32935 0.6394 0.07376 
% significant 0.43283582 0.13433 0.12069 0.173077 0.241379 0.02985 0.01724 0.01923 0.034483 0.07463 0.04478 0.1194 
# of positive and significant 25 6 5 2 5 0 1 0 1 0 3 8 
# of negative and significant 4 3 2 7 2 2 0 1 0 5 0 0 
Total 67 67 58 52 29 67 58 52 29 67 67 67 
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Table 10. Moody’s VEC Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports the results from Moody’s VEC variance decomposition. The first column lists 
the forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean values are 
calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. Standard 
errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. P-values 
are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports statistics on 
CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS spreads and 
the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The fifth column 
reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit rating variance 
explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. 48 equations are estimated in total. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
CR 
variance 
CDS 
contribution 
CR 
contribution 
Mean 12.815 100.000 0.000 0.060 0.837 99.163 
SE(mean) 1.981 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.342 0.342 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
2 period avgs. 
Mean 22.763 99.737 0.263 0.083 1.218 98.782 
SE(mean) 3.928 0.123 0.123 0.007 0.459 0.459 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 
3 period avgs. 
Mean 29.935 99.542 0.458 0.101 1.455 98.545 
SE(mean) 5.332 0.189 0.189 0.009 0.572 0.572 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
4 period avgs. 
Mean 36.160 99.290 0.710 0.116 1.755 98.245 
SE(mean) 6.604 0.291 0.291 0.010 0.770 0.770 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 
5 period avgs. 
Mean 41.682 99.001 0.999 0.129 1.991 98.009 
SE(mean) 7.762 0.397 0.397 0.011 0.934 0.934 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 
6 period avgs. 
Mean 46.677 98.810 1.190 0.140 2.173 97.827 
SE(mean) 8.819 0.467 0.467 0.012 1.071 1.071 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 
7 period avgs. 
Mean 51.149 98.676 1.324 0.151 2.319 97.681 
SE(mean) 9.778 0.514 0.514 0.013 1.176 1.176 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 
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Table 10. Moody’s VEC Variance Decomposition (Continued) 
8 period avgs. 
Mean 55.174 98.574 1.426 0.160 2.447 97.553 
SE(mean) 10.656 0.544 0.544 0.014 1.262 1.262 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 
9 period avgs. 
Mean 58.885 98.479 1.521 0.170 2.563 97.437 
SE(mean) 11.467 0.567 0.567 0.014 1.333 1.333 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 
10 period avgs. 
Mean 62.347 98.388 1.612 0.178 2.671 97.329 
SE(mean) 12.225 0.584 0.584 0.015 1.392 1.392 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 
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Table 11. S&P VEC Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports the results from S&P VEC variance decomposition. The first column lists the 
forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean values are 
calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. Standard 
errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. P-values 
are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports statistics on 
CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS spreads and 
the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The fifth column 
reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit rating variance 
explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. 91 equations are estimated in total. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
Variance 
CDS 
Contribution 
CR 
Contribution 
CR 
Variance 
CDS 
Contribution 
CR 
Contribution 
Mean 15.987 100 0 0.059 0.615 99.385 
SE(mean) 2.603 0 0 0.004 0.199 0.199 
p-value 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
2 period avgs. 
      Mean 24.873 99.893 0.107 0.084 0.827 99.173 
SE(mean) 3.935 0.023 0.023 0.006 0.221 0.221 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 period avgs. 
      Mean 32.104 99.725 0.275 0.102 1.065 98.935 
SE(mean) 5.072 0.071 0.071 0.008 0.25 0.25 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 period avgs. 
      Mean 38.654 99.383 0.617 0.118 1.263 98.737 
SE(mean) 6.132 0.163 0.163 0.009 0.266 0.266 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 period avgs. 
      Mean 44.681 99.024 0.976 0.132 1.458 98.542 
SE(mean) 7.16 0.286 0.286 0.01 0.295 0.295 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 period avgs. 
      Mean 50.156 98.786 1.214 0.144 1.613 98.387 
SE(mean) 8.145 0.346 0.346 0.011 0.32 0.32 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 11. S&P VEC Variance Decomposition (Continued) 
7 period avgs.       
Mean 55.316 98.553 1.447 0.156 1.739 98.261 
SE(mean) 9.137 0.443 0.443 0.012 0.338 0.338 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 period avgs. 
      Mean 60.270 98.325 1.675 0.167 1.861 98.139 
SE(mean) 10.158 0.553 0.553 0.013 0.357 0.357 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 period avgs. 
      Mean 65.048 98.133 1.867 0.177 1.971 98.029 
SE(mean) 11.217 0.644 0.644 0.013 0.376 0.376 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 period 
avgs. 
      Mean 69.667 97.956 2.044 0.186 2.067 97.933 
SE(mean) 12.337 0.723 0.723 0.014 0.392 0.392 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 12. Fitch VEC Variance Decomposition 
 
This table reports the results from Fitch VEC variance decomposition. The first column lists the 
forecast period error being analyzed followed by the statistics calculated. Mean values are 
calculated by taking the arithmetic average of each estimate for that specific period. Standard 
errors are defined as the mean value divided by the square root of total observations. P-values 
are then calculated using the Student’s t-distribution. The second column reports statistics on 
CDS variance, the third provides the percentage of CDS variance explained by CDS spreads and 
the fourth reports the percentage of CDS variance explained by credit ratings. The fifth column 
reports credit rating variance, columns six and seven report the percent of credit rating variance 
explained by CDS spreads and credit ratings respectively. 67 equations in total are estimated. 
 
1 period avgs. 
CDS 
Variance 
CDS 
Contribution 
CR 
Contribution 
CR 
Variance 
CDS 
Contribution 
CR 
Contribution 
Mean 14.460 100.000 0.000 0.074 0.579 99.421 
SE(mean) 2.815 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.225 0.225 
p-value 0 0  0 0.01 0 
2 period avgs. 
      Mean 22.910 99.179 0.821 0.102 0.758 99.242 
SE(mean) 4.408 0.650 0.650 0.014 0.256 0.256 
p-value 0 0 0.21 0 0.004 0 
3 period avgs. 
      Mean 29.976 98.964 1.036 0.125 0.989 99.011 
SE(mean) 5.768 0.750 0.750 0.017 0.352 0.352 
p-value 0 0 0.17 0 0.007 0 
4 period avgs. 
      Mean 35.722 98.854 1.146 0.143 1.114 98.886 
SE(mean) 6.846 0.797 0.797 0.019 0.398 0.398 
p-value 0 0 0.16 0 0.007 0 
5 period avgs. 
      Mean 40.786 98.724 1.276 0.159 1.201 98.799 
SE(mean) 7.799 0.846 0.846 0.021 0.425 0.425 
p-value 0 0 0.14 0 0.006 0 
6 period avgs. 
      Mean 45.285 98.659 1.341 0.174 1.284 98.716 
SE(mean) 8.647 0.869 0.869 0.023 0.446 0.446 
p-value 0 0 0.13 0 0.005 0 
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Table 12. Fitch VEC Variance Decomposition (Continued) 
7 period avgs.       
Mean 49.358 98.615 1.385 0.187 1.370 98.630 
SE(mean) 9.416 0.885 0.885 0.025 0.461 0.461 
p-value 0 0 0.12 0 0.004 0 
8 period avgs. 
      Mean 53.050 98.581 1.419 0.199 1.462 98.538 
SE(mean) 10.116 0.894 0.894 0.026 0.473 0.473 
p-value 0 0 0.12 0 0.003 0 
9 period avgs. 
      Mean 56.455 98.554 1.446 0.210 1.565 98.435 
SE(mean) 10.763 0.899 0.899 0.028 0.487 0.487 
p-value 0 0 0.11 0 0.002 0 
10 period 
avgs. 
      Mean 59.617 98.528 1.472 0.221 1.679 98.321 
SE(mean) 11.366 0.905 0.905 0.029 0.504 0.504 
p-value 0 0 0.11 0 0.001 0 
 
